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Abstract
Wars and the strategies used to fight them have constantly evolved throughout the
history of mankind, simultaneously revealing our innovative brilliance and our
inherent inability to avoid conflict with one another. The current state of the
United States’ “War on Terror,” composed of the Afghanistan conflict and
outlying operations in countries such as Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere
around the world, has spurred exemplary advances used to combat a new type of
enemy. Thus enters the drone, a remotely piloted aircraft that can be used for
reconnaissance purposes or offensive targeting operations.
The drone is unique in that the pilot is not located in the aircraft, but instead
remotely controls the aircraft from a distance that can range from a few miles to
halfway around the world. At a cruising altitude, cameras on the drone can zoom
in on an object or person with such clarity that they can read license plate
numbers and even allow the pilot to identify individuals on the ground. Such a
tool has infinite uses in warfare, particularly against the insurgent enemy that the
United States fights today. However, since their debut to the battlefield, the use
of drones has been met with skepticism and claims of illegality.
The purpose of this capstone thesis will be to analyze the drone as an instrument
of warfare and to determine: (1) whether drones are even a “legal weapon” to use
in war; (2) whether the manner in which the United States’ drones are being used
in the Middle East today is legal and ethical; (3) and lastly, if indeed drones are a
legitimate weapon of war, are they an effective contribution to the United States’
strategy of counterinsurgency and counter-network operations worldwide.
To accomplish these three goals, an analysis will be conducted of both domestic
and international laws regarding the conduct of warfare to establish whether
drones and the manner in which the United States has been employing drones are
legal. Secondly, this thesis will break down the United States’ strategy and tactics
in combating hostile non-state actors worldwide to first see what the objectives
and end goals are, and then to see if the benefits of using drones outweigh the
costs.
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Preface1

“We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are
fighting to eliminate you.”
Hussein Massawi, Hezbollah

The Rise of al-Qaeda
1

This preface is not designed to explain the entire history, nor all of the events that led to the
United States’ current military position in the Middle East. That task is large enough to have
numerous books and theses written on it, in fact there are many such works in existence today. It
is written as a basic introduction into the rise of the jihad movement, the creation of the al-Qaeda
network and the United States’ presence in the Middle East today for those readers who may not
be familiar with that history.

2
There are two histories which are significant to understanding the rise of
the al-Qaeda network and its reasons behind conducting the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks: a history of the origins of jihad, and a history of the formation of
the al-Qaeda network and how Osama bin Laden came to be its leader. Both of
which will briefly be outlined in this section of the preface.
The concept of jihad is an ancient one in which each Muslim has an
internal struggle to live by the Five Pillars of Islam in order to be a “good” human
being in the eyes of Allah and, correspondingly, a violent external struggle for the
Islamic religion.2 These two struggles became known as the Greater and Lesser
Jihad as well as the Defensive and Offensive Jihad. Throughout the history of the
Islamic religion the concept of jihad has been used to mobilize Muslims to take up
arms against numerous enemies that religious leaders have deemed worthy of
fighting. In the mid-1900s, Sayyid Qutb, in addition to mentoring many future
members of al-Qaeda’s leadership including Ayman al-Zawahiri, theorized that
the world had fallen into Jahiliyya.3 4 He believed that Islam needed to return to
its purest form, any nation with laws based on anything other than the Sharia5
were jahili and that Jihad was necessary to purify Islam and create the Muslim
state. Most importantly however, Qutb stated that it was the duty of all Muslims
to destroy all jahili systems because of the obstacles that they put in the way of a
pure Islamic system. Qutb was executed in the 1960s before he could see his

2

Sageman, Marc. "The Origins of Jihad." Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 2004. 1-24. Print.
3
The ignorance that plagued the world before the arrival of the Prophet
4
Sageman, Marc. "The Origins of Jihad." Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 2004. 1-24. Print.
5
Islamic Law derived from the Qur’an
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dream realized, however, he, along with other Islamic scholars and religious
leaders, redefined the jihad into a concept that would be used in the future to
initiate war against the west.
The history of the creation of the al-Qaeda network began with Sheikh
Abdallah Azzam. Azzam fought with the Egyptian Salafi Mujahed during the
Afghan War against the Soviet Union. He believed in a jihad to cast the
Christians out of the Muslim lands and used his association with the mujahed to
create networks of the most influential, motivated and skilled mujahedin fighters
around the world.6 However, Azzam’s most famous and most interesting quality
was that he was the teacher and mentor of Osama bin Laden prior to Azzam’s
death.7 With his death, Osama bin Laden became the undisputed leader of the
network that he and Azzam had begun to create. All of Azzam’s contacts and the
details of his mujahed network passed to bin Laden, which would become a
centerpiece of the future al-Qaeda network.
Osama bin Laden used his fortune to begin to train former mujahedin
fighters in his training camps and then allowed them to travel back home to
spread the jihad worldwide.8 The training camps were originally in Afghanistan,
Bosnia, Yemen, the Philippines and the Sudan; the first al-Qaeda trainees were

6

Sageman, Marc. "The Origins of Jihad." Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania, 2004. 1-24. Print.
7
Abdallah Azzam was killed by a car bomb in 1989. Although no one took credit for the attack
and no culprit was ever discovered, it was widely known that Azzam and bin Laden had numerous
arguments about the future of jihad at the time. Bin Laden’s involvement in the event is still
unclear to this day.
8
An idea that greatly differed from Azzam’s view, who believed that al-Qaeda should concentrate
its efforts in Afghanistan to create an Islamist government and to combat Israel.
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said to have spread to the Philippines, Yemen, Kashmir, Indonesia and Egypt.9
This process began the global jihad. Some of al-Qaeda’s first operations were
supporting other terrorist organizations, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad
(EIJ),10 bringing bin Laden and al-Zawahiri together. Al-Qaeda headquarters
relocated from Pakistan to the Sudan and finally to Afghanistan in 1996.11 The
Taliban, the ruling authority in Afghanistan at the time, maintained good relations
with Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization. This move allowed alQaeda complete freedom, which they had never had previously, within the
Afghan borders to train and conduct operations.
With the move to Afghanistan, the final piece of the logistical puzzle that
made al-Qaeda an international terrorist network capable of conducting a global
jihad was in place. In August 1996 Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa,12 and cowrote another in February 1998 with Ayman al-Zawahiri, declaring war against
the United States to Muslims worldwide.13 The end goal of bin Laden and alZawahiri’s dream was the existence of an Islamic State, independent of western
influence, and eventually, the eradication of western culture and society. The
development of the idea of jihad, the historical development of the al-Qaeda
network and the philosophy of Osama bin Laden ultimately led to the global jihad
that we have seen in the past two decades.

9

Sageman, Marc. "The Evolution of Jihad." Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 25-59. Print.
10
Ibid.
11
"The Foundation of New Terrorism." 9-11 Commission Report.National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United StatesWeb. 10/5/2011.
12
bin Laden, Osama. "Osama bin Laden's 1996 Fatwa " 8/1996Web. 10/5/2011
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html>.
13
bin Laden, Osama, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. "Al Qaeda's 1998 Fatwa " 2/1998Web. 10/5/2011
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html>.
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The Aftermath of 9/11/2001
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States became
decisively engaged in an armed conflict with the al-Qaeda terror network as well
as insurgents in Afghanistan. This conflict, labeled Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF), would completely redefine and restructure the manner in which the United
States’ military conducts offensive operations and counterinsurgency operations
against non-state enemies. The al-Qaeda network was a type of enemy that U.S.
forces were not accustomed to fighting, not confined by the limits of a state, it
resided or held influence in Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, the Philippines,
Pakistan and other locations around the world. It also was not limited by the
restrictions of conventional warfare, choosing instead to conduct guerrilla warfare
and establish insurgencies to fight the United States over the local populations of
many countries around the world. This would give them an advantage, rather
than conducting open assaults on U.S. forces, which would surely lead to defeat,
they would fight to control local populations, which U.S. leaders and soldiers
would most certainly be ignorant of. This idea, as U.S. strategists would discover,
would prove to be al-Qaeda’s greatest advantage and the United States’ greatest
obstacle in the conflict.
President George W. Bush theorized that the spread of democracy, in the
long term, would be the solution to combating terrorism. In the short term,
however, he outlined four goals for OEF: “preventing attacks by terrorist
networks, denying Weapons of Mass Destruction to rogue states and terrorist
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allies who seek to use them, denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue
states and denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and
launching pad for terror.”14 All of these goals, which were used as a starting point
in the effort to defeat al-Qaeda, involved a campaign with many fronts, in many
places around the world. As a state actor, the U.S. was limited in its ability to
follow al-Qaeda across international borders. Al-Qaeda leaders quickly fled over
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to seek protection in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan where they knew U.S. conventional forces could
not follow. Without the refuge of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda reestablished its
headquarters in Pakistan and began to send leaders and money to other locations
around the world including Somalia and Yemen where they would not be as
easily hunted, in an effort to re-strengthen the network’s ability to attack Europe
and America. President Bush, recognizing that sending conventional forces to
these locations would be costly and would take focus away from the fight in
Afghanistan, began utilizing alternative forces and tactics to continue to fight alQaeda despite their ability to reestablish themselves in other countries around the
world...

14

"National Strategy For Combating Terrorism "Web. 9/5/2011 <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/>.
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The Current Status of the United States’ Drone Program15

“We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in
planes. The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in
them at all.... Take everything you’ve learned about aviation in
war, throw it out the window, and let’s go to work on tomorrow’s
aviation, it will be different from anything the world has ever
seen.”
General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold
Statement Made in 1949

The Drone
A new technological capability was developed by the United States in its
effort to locate and destroy al-Qaeda and insurgent leaders in countries around the
world. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs), also known as Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs)16, were seen as one of the most effective means to reach
terrorists anywhere in the world. More casually known as “drones,” these are

15

The content, statistics and facts of this section are accurate as of April 17, 2012
Although the academic community uses these terms to describe these aircraft, it is worth noting
that operators and many military and political strategists dislike these two terms because of the
implication that the aircraft are “unmanned” or not controlled by humans. The aircraft is
“unmanned” in the sense that no one is physically in the vehicle, however, they are always
controlled by a human pilot in a remote location.
16
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fixed winged aircraft piloted remotely, sometimes from thousands of miles away.
Although drones were originally designed as reconnaissance tools to be used by
the military to simply locate enemy forces or scout terrain ahead of a ground
force, drones quickly evolved with the capability to carry weapon systems. In
fact, the military and CIA’s drone fleets have been equipped with AGM-114R
Hellfire Missiles, each costing roughly $65,000,17 and each having a 20 pound
warhead capable of reaching targets 8000 meters away.18 The most commonly
used drones are the Predator and its larger brother the Reaper because of their
status as “weaponized drones,” capable of carrying Hellfire missiles for thousands
of miles without needing to refuel.19 20 The ease of changing pilots at a control
station rather than having to land a conventional fighter to switch pilots is an
additional noteworthy benefit to utilizing drones.
Drones have been used heavily since the beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom and the United States’ “War on Terror,” killing many insurgents and alQaeda leaders around the world. The first known drone strike is believed to have
occurred on November 3, 2002, when a Predator drone targeted a car traveling in
Yemen, killing five men including Qaed Senya al-Harithi, a known al-Qaeda
leader directly responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole.21 Since the first
drone strike, the use of drones in combating insurgents and al-Qaeda has
17

"France To Buy Hellfire Missiles at U.S. Price - Defense News "Web. 9/5/2011
<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3354207>.
18
"Boeing/Lockheed Martin AGM-114 Hellfire "Web. 9/5/2011 <http://www.designationsystems.net/dusrm/m-114.html>.
19
"Factsheets : MQ-1B Predator "Web. 9/5/2011
<http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=122>.
20
"Factsheets : MQ-9 Reaper "Web. 9/5/2011
<http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405>.
21
Alston, Philip. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary Or Arbitrary
Executions to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Philip Alston. 3 Vol. , 2010. Print.
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increased at an exponential rate. All branches of the U.S. military have used a
wider variety of drones in Iraq and Afghanistan other than the Reaper and
Predator to include smaller models, hand-held models and models that are
designed for reconnaissance purposes only.

The CIA’s Drone War
After the start of the Afghanistan conflict, al-Qaeda leaders and members
fled across the border to Pakistan and to other locations that the organization had
been spreading to prior to the invasion. It became clear at that time that the
conventional war tactics of invading an enemy and destroying them was not going
to be effective enough to completely destroy al-Qaeda. In response to this,
special operations forces were used to hunt down al-Qaeda members who resided
outside of the “hot battlefields” in Afghanistan and Iraq. Drones were exactly the
technological innovation that was needed by the United States to track down and
target al-Qaeda. They are capable of flying for much longer than conventional
fighters and able to individually track the movements of select individuals or
groups as a whole. They can fly at extremely high altitudes at a relatively slow
speed while remaining with a target. Their classification as “unmanned” creates
an attitude, in the political and legal realms, that they are less intrusive on a
foreign nation’s sovereignty than ground forces or a traditional airstrike.
U.S. officials quickly realized that al-Qaeda had spread to numerous
locations around the world: Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya to name a few.
Although it had been suspected in the early to mid 2000s that the United States
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had struck against al-Qaeda using drones in Yemen,22 it had been unconfirmed
and it was presumed to be limited to a few isolated incidents. The bulk of the
CIAs drone strikes occurred in Pakistan, particularly in the FATA region and
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.23 It is unknown exactly how many drone
strikes have occurred since their first appearance in 2002 because the United
States government has denied using drones outside of the Afghanistan and Iraq
conflicts and refuses to disclose any information about the program or its
activities. Despite the limit of open information, a small number of individuals
studying drones have collected public data on drone strikes from news reports and
compiled them. Massive discrepancies have surrounded the statistical
performance of U.S. drones because of the United States government’s refusal to
release information about individual strikes. John Brennan, one of President
Obama’s top counterterrorism advisors, publicly stated early in 2011 that the
surgical precision of drone strikes have led to no collateral damage within the past
year.24 Similar claims have been made by other U.S. officials, some even
suggesting that the total amount of collateral damage for drones since their
inception has been in the single digits of civilian casualties.
“The Long War Journal,” a project started by the Foundation for Defense
of Democracies conducted a study of known drone strikes in Pakistan and reached

22

"Wikileaks cable corroborates evidence of US airstrikes in Yemen | Amnesty International
"Web. 9/1/2011 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/wikileaks-cable-corroboratesevidence-us-airstrikes-yemen-2010-12-01>.
23
This statement is based upon the fact that while Pakistan is a more developed nation with an
active media presence to monitor drone strikes, countries like Yemen and Somalia are not. It is
assumed, with the information at hand, that this statement is true but there are likely to be a
number of drone strikes conducted by the United States in Yemen that were never properly
recorded or reported.
24
Shane, Scott. "C.I.A. Claim of no Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes." Print. 8/11/2011 2011.
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conclusions that generally supported the U.S. officials’ claims of low collateral
damage. “The Long War Journal” concluded, up to this point, that the United
States has made roughly 290 airstrikes in Pakistan since 2004,25 and that the vast
majority of drone strikes in Pakistan took place in North or South Waziristan.
The project also concludes that those strikes have led to 2,227 “al-Qaeda and
affiliate deaths,” with only 138 civilian casualties.26 Although it does not arrive at
the same conclusion as John Brennan and other government officials who have
claimed low amounts of civilian casualties, the findings of this study certainly
support the idea that U.S. drones have caused relatively little civilian harm when
compared to the amount of military gain that they have provided.27
Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation created a similar study
called the “Year of the Drone” in which he used and cited individual news reports
to come up with, what he claims, is the most accurate estimate of drone strike
numbers and casualty statistics in existence today. Bergen concludes that 326
drone strikes have been conducted in Pakistan since the first known use of drones
by the United States in that country, almost exactly what was found in the “Long
War Journal.”28 Bergen also projects the same progression of strikes annually,
building up to a peak in 2010. Bergen estimates that between 1,402 and 2,184
militants have been killed since 2004, and between 293 and 471 civilian casualties

25

Roggio, Bill, and Alexander Mayer. "Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 20042012." March 30, 2012.Web. The Long War Journal. April 17, 2012
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php>.
26
Ibid.
27
In this statement, “military gain” can be defined as the successful targeting and destruction of
al-Qaeda members and affiliates.
28
Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "The Year of the Drone." April 4, 2012.Web. April
17, 2012 <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones#2011chart>.
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have resulted in the drone strikes in that same time period.29 Bergen goes even
further by tallying the total amount of “militant leaders” who were killed in these
strikes, and concludes that 43 have been killed since 2004.30
The statistical data behind drone performance is certainly a source of
debate and sparks arguments that have surrounded academic and strategic
discussions of drones throughout the history of their use. Because of these
debates and the United States government’s refusal to release information about
drone strikes, the U.S. drone targeting program has undergone scrutiny from the
international community. The United Nations and numerous human rights
organizations have led the charge,31 claiming that the lack of transparency makes
it impossible for a third party to determine if the program is being used in
accordance with International Humanitarian Law and various treaties. Many ask
from a legal perspective, and rightfully so, whether or not drones are being legally
used or whether or not they can even be considered legal weapons of war because
of their potential to provide results where civilian harm outweighs military gain.
The question of drone legality expands drastically in the strategy that the
United States is using to employ drones in the fight against al-Qaeda. Drone
strikes within Iraq and Afghanistan have been generally accepted as legal by the
majority of supporters and critics of drones alike, however, the United States’ use
of drones stretches well beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan. As
previously stated, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Pakistan have all had drone strikes
29

Ibid.
Ibid.
31
Worsnip, Patrick. "U.N. official calls for study of ethics, legality of unmanned weapons "Web.
9/1/2011 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/24/AR2010102400035.html>.
30
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occur within their borders. This has led many legal experts to question the
legitimacy of a campaign to conduct targeted killings in multiple nations around
the world and whether or not such action breaches the sovereignty of these
nations. The last major source of legal problems with drones is the fact that all
strikes occurring outside of Iraq and Afghanistan are conducted by the CIA. This
is potentially problematic for two reasons: first, that the CIA is a civilian-run
organization that is conducting targeted killings, an idea that many have
challenged; second, that some legal scholars have argued that CIA operatives are
not combatants and are therefore not afforded immunity for their actions.
Drones have been on the move at a strategic level. Drones entered the
U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda as a tactic that could be used to surgically target and
destroy al-Qaeda leaders in order to cripple the organization by removing any
figureheads, financial backers, tacticians or philosophical leaders who recruit
individuals and plan or conduct attacks for al-Qaeda. Progressing from their first
use in Yemen in 2002, the drone strike tactic has been used more and more
heavily in Pakistan. By the end of 2008, the level of drone usage became so high
that drones, in the scope of the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda, merited
reclassification in their role in the conflict. Drone strikes made a shift from a
tactic to eliminate al-Qaeda leaders, to a strategy to combat al-Qaeda as a whole.
Admittedly, not only was the number of drone strikes rising, but the geographic
locations where they were occurring expanded from Pakistan and Yemen to an
increased use in Yemen, Somalia and, most recently, the first instance of a drone
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strike in Libya.32 All of which begs the question, just what is the role of drones in
the ongoing fight against al-Qaeda and what will it become in the future?

The Big Question
Drones have become an intricate part of the United States’ pursuit of alQaeda and its affiliates in the conflict. They have ultimately evolved from a tactic
selectively used to eliminate key leaders to a strategy employed to combat the alQaeda network around the world. The question of drone legality could not be
more complex and multifaceted. International Law was written and developed
following the world wars with the intention of governing conduct in a
conventional war. Little has been done to advance or evolve these frameworks in
meaningful ways to make them applicable to unconventional wars against
enemies that do not wear uniforms and in fact have chosen hiding among the
civilian population as their method of fighting. Debate has surrounded the United
States’ counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine since its development, and the role of
drones within COIN has become a very polarizing discussion. It seems that
COIN’s objective to win the “hearts and minds” of the civilian population has led
scholars and strategists to question whether or not aspects of COIN doctrine such
as drone use are actually accomplishing that objective. Because drones are used
for lethal purposes, and civilians are at times exposed to the attacks, it is not at all
unreasonable to ask whether or not drones have a place within COIN operations.

32

Raddatz, Martha, and Kirit Radia. "Pentagon Confirms First Predator Drone Strike in Libya
"Web. 9/25/2011 <http://abcnews.go.com/International/pentagon-confirms-predator-drone-strikelibya/story?id=13442570>.
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The Legality of Targeted Killings and the United States’ Drone Program

“In today's wars, there are no morals. We believe the worst thieves
in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. We
do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as
we are concerned, they are all targets.”
Osama bin Laden
In his 1996 Fatwa

17

Imagine that today, right now, the deputy Director of the CIA receives
confirmation that a terrorist on the president’s “Kill or Capture List” has been
located. Thirty minutes from now, a drone takes off from a classified airbase
somewhere in the Middle East, flies to the location that the terrorist is said to be
and confirms that the intelligence is indeed accurate. The drone operator receives
an order to destroy the target and launches one of the Hellfire missiles on the
aircraft. After the dust clears, the drone continues to fly over the target and
confirms that the target was destroyed. The drone then flies back to the airbase
and lands. Mission completed.
Although this sequence of events may seem surreal to many readers, it is
the process that is occurring dozens, even hundreds, of times per year resulting in
hundreds of fatalities. The question that must be asked now is whether or not this
tactic of eliminating terrorists by the United States is legal. What if this terrorist
was killed in Afghanistan? Would it still be legal if the strike had been conducted
in Yemen? What if the Yemeni government told the United States that it did not
consent to such a strike? If the terrorist was alone in a field, would it be different
if he was hiding in a school or standing in the middle of a market? Would it make
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a difference if the terrorist was a mid-level leader or if he was an al-Qaeda
mastermind like Ayman al-Zawahiri?
These are the questions that U.S. strategists, international critics and the
academic and legal communities have been asking over the last nine years since
the first known use of drones. Unfortunately, international law and the laws of
war allow each individual nation to interpret, relatively freely, much of what is
written regarding concepts such as necessity and proportionality. As such, it is
extremely difficult to ascertain a definite answer as to whether or not the manner
in which the United States uses drones is legal and such an answer is often based
on point of view rather than clearly defined laws, treaties and precedents. The
following section will address the legality of “targeted killings” and the United
States’ drone use around the world.

The Legality of Drones as a Weapon of War
When coming to a decision regarding the previously mentioned,
hypothetical situation, the first question is whether or not a drone is even a legal
weapon within the context of war. Numerous international treaties throughout
history have been written for the purpose of limiting the weapons33 that militaries
around the world and throughout time can use to prevent suffering and collateral
damage. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 specifically state that combating
parties do not have unlimited choices in the weapons that they use.34 The Geneva

33

Examples of such weapons are chemical and biological weapons, triangular-shaped bayonets as
well as land-mines. These are weapons that are not capable of discriminated between military and
civilian targets or cause unnecessary injury.
34
"The Geneva Convention of 1949 - Additional Protocol I 1977- Article 35, 1
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Conventions limit any weapon that causes “superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering,”35 the weapons used must be capable of discriminating between civilian
and military targets with a high degree of accuracy36 and precautions must be
taken before each attack to prevent civilian loss of life.37
In the early stages of drone use many legal scholars argued that drone
aircraft are an illegal weapon because of a low accuracy rate, putting civilians at
risk, the unprecedented safety that they afford their operators and because of a
psychological effect known as the “PlayStation effect” or the “video game effect.”
As the previous section showed, and as many of these scholars realized over time,
drones are just as accurate and in fact are often more accurate than a traditional
airstrike. Drone cameras are capable of identifying individuals during flight and
are said to even be capable of reading license plate numbers from their cruising
altitude. Additionally, it has been suggested by many that the act of having the
pilot on the ground makes him or her less susceptible to human error due to
fatigue, nervousness or the psychological effects of traveling faster than the speed
of sound, which a traditional combat pilot experiences.
The safety that drones afford their operators was an issue used against
drones in their early use, although it was also an argument that was quickly

." International Committee of the Red Cross. 6/8/1977 1977.Web. 8/29/2011
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument>.
35
"The Geneva Convention of 1949 - Additional Protocol I 1977- Article 35, 2
." International Committee of the Red Cross. 6/8/1977 1977.Web. 8/29/2011
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/470?opendocument>.
36
"The Geneva Convention of 1949 - Additional Protocol I 1977- Article 51
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dismissed. Nearly every technological development in warfare has been for the
sole purpose of killing a target more effectively, better protecting the individual
using the new instrument or both. Saying that drones are illegal because of the
safety that they provide to their pilots is like saying that rifles are illegal weapons
because of the distance that they provide between the shooter and the person
being shot. On a side note, the United States military qualification levels with an
M-16 rifle are far less accurate than the accuracy rates of drones in practice.
The “PlayStation effect” was a theory that stated that drone operators
would not appreciate the gravity of killing targets because of their distance both
from the target and from the aircraft in which they are flying. A theory
paralleling Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman’s who hypothesized that the
farther from a target one becomes, the easier and less psychologically taxing the
act of killing becomes.38 Although it has not been proven that Grossman’s theory
does not apply to drone operators, drone operators have not been immune to the
psychological stresses that come with conducting military operations to include
post-traumatic stress disorder.39 40 It has been hypothesized by some individuals
within the drone community that drones provide more of an opportunity for PTSD
to develop because, unlike traditional pilots, after a drone strike occurs, the drone
continues to fly over the target to assess the damage and confirm the target’s
destruction. The unusual expectation of the drone pilot to view the havoc
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unleashed by the Hellfire missiles that he or she just fired certainly would be a
source of psychological trauma that would conflict with the notion that drone
pilots are somehow “just playing video games.”

Why U.S. Drone Strikes are Legal
In this analysis, there must be a clear distinction between domestic law
and international law. Domestic and international law run in parallel and are both
applicable to the use of drones because authority must be granted to the president
of the United States by Congress to make drone use legal under domestic law;
simultaneously, multiple requirements regarding the use of drones must be met to
make drone use legal under international law. The possibility exists that drones
could be acceptable under one legal code but not under the other.
With regard to domestic law, the president of the United States cannot
simply decide to conduct attacks on individuals around the world as he deems
sufficient. Section 2 of Article II in the U.S. Constitution states that the president
is the, “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the Militia of the several States,” however, Section 8 of Article I of the U.S.
Constitution reserves the right to declare war to Congress alone.41 Domestic law
dictates that the president receives a declaration of war, or be in a situation so
grave and immediate that the use of force would be necessary for the defense and
survival of the United States in order to conduct any military attack without
congressional approval. While the United States Congress did not declare war,
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following the attacks of September 11, 2001 it passed a piece of legislation called
the “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” which granted the president the
right to use force against those “nations, organizations or persons” responsible for
the 9/11 attacks and to continue to protect the United States against those
parties.42 In retrospect, this legislation was somewhat of a “knee-jerk” reaction to
the terrorist attacks, but gave the president almost unlimited power to go
anywhere and use any legal means to find the culprits of the 9/11 attacks and
bring them to justice, without any specified limits to the amount of force, time
that it might take or any specific geographic limitations.
The “Authorization for Use of Military Force” is the strongest and most
significant legal justification for why the president of the United States can
authorize drone strikes against al-Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. It
obeys all Constitutional requirements with regard to the use of force, was a votedupon piece of legislation that the U.S. Congress passed and is consistent with the
system of checks and balances within the system of the United States government.
Although some argue that this legislation is unconstitutional, nothing could be
further from the truth. In fact, this legislation is a perfect example of checks and
balances, specifically congress’ ability to limit the president. More to the point,
the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” was conceptualized and passed
through congress with the specific intention of giving the president a blanketed
power to bring the al-Qaeda organization to justice. It is important to note that,
even though no time limit is specified in the “Authorization for Use of Military

42

"Authorization for Use of Military Force- Sept. 18, 2001 "Web. 9/26/2011
<http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/terrorism/sjres23.es.html>.

23
Force,” this legislation is not permanent. If congress felt that it no longer wished
to permit the president this power, it could write another law revoking the
“Authorization for Use of Military Force.”
It is important to define and identify the differences between targeted
killing, extrajudicial killing, and assassination. The term “targeted killing” is not
specifically defined in international or domestic law. Targeted killing can be
defined as a specific attack with the intention of delivering lethal force against an
individual of significant importance to the leadership or operational support of an
enemy force within the context of self-defense or an armed conflict. The main
separation between targeted killing and assassination is the context in which it is
conducted. Domestic law permits the application of lethal force against
individual “belligerent leaders” when acting in self-defense or within the scope of
an armed conflict, and therefore does not conform to the definition of an
assassination.43 The “Authorization for Use of Military Force” is a legal power
given to the president to bring al-Qaeda to justice, which allows the president to
use force against individual al-Qaeda terrorists, should it be impossible to capture
them or if they are continuing to plan attacks against the United States or its allies.
The idea that drone strikes are extrajudicial killings ignores the fact that the
United States’ drone strikes are occurring within the context of an armed conflict,
where U.S. forces have the right to target individuals of the opposing force.
There is no legal requirement of a state to legally process the targets of an attack
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within an armed conflict.44 Imagine U.S. soldiers having to put insurgents
through a trial prior to firing at them in Afghanistan.
The realm of international law is far more multi-faceted than domestic law
in this instance and requires many additional questions to be answered prior to
labeling an attack as “legal.” Under international law, there are few legal reasons
for a state to launch attacks against another state or within another state’s borders.
One of the main legal precedents supporting the drone campaign in international
law is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which states that a state has the
inherent right to use force to defend itself and its people from an attack by another
state, a state sponsored organization, a non-state sponsored organization or an
individual.45 46 Many opponents of the United States’ use of drones have argued
that this legal precedent is irrelevant at this point because few, if any of the alQaeda terrorists are presenting an “imminent threat” to the United States at this
time. While Article 51 does require that the threat presented be imminent, it is
necessary for the term “imminent” to be redefined when applied to a terrorist
attack. While in conventional warfare there are major signals of an impending
attack such as the massing of troops along a border, few individuals will argue
that a terrorist attack, such as the Christmas 2009 “underwear bomber” or any
other terrorist attack, could have been stopped on the day of the attack. Because
of the lack of visible preparation and the inability to stop an attack once it has
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begun, it has become customary in U.S. domestic law that the president be able to
use deadly force if there is no way to arrest or stop an impending threat.47 In all
of the locations that the United States is striking with drones, there is almost
always an inability to arrest the identified targets.
While it is significant that the inherent right to self-defense permits drone
strikes to prevent al-Qaeda from attacking U.S. soil, it is not enough to legally
justify the hundreds of drone strikes that have occurred in the past decade. The
most significant international law argument for drones, and indeed the most
unprecedented, is the argument that by passing the “Authorization for Use of
Military Force,” starting the Afghanistan Conflict and developing the drone
campaign, the United States entered into an armed conflict with the al-Qaeda
organization to effectively defend itself under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This
is immensely important because in an armed conflict a state has the ability to
target an enemy force without having to evaluate whether or not each individual
target presents a direct threat within that state’s borders.48 This should come as
no surprise to anyone, recognizing that the goal of an armed conflict, generally
speaking, is to destroy enemy forces or hinder their ability to continue the
conflict. Specifically targeting individuals within the opposing force is one such
method of accomplishing this objective. Additionally, specifically killing key
personnel within an enemy force in an armed conflict becomes a targeted killing,
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legal under international and domestic law, rather than an assassination or
extrajudicial killing outside of the context of an armed conflict.
The previously mentioned idea that a state can be in a conflict with a nonstate actor is not unprecedented. Starting a conflict with a “non-state” entity has
been done by the United States when fighting the Confederacy, Indian Tribes and
the Viet Cong.49 The problem that arises in labeling the United States in an armed
conflict is the fact that al-Qaeda, unlike other “non-state” entities that the United
States has previously fought, does not reside in one specific nation. Therefore,
defining the geographic limits of this conflict is critical, especially since the
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” does not specify a geographic limit for
where the president may pursue al-Qaeda. The United States has argued that its
conflict with al-Qaeda is not limited to any specific nation or list of nations and
instead extends anywhere that al-Qaeda may go. While this argument is rather
convenient for the United States, it is also instrumental in its conflict with alQaeda. One of the main reasons that al-Qaeda was able to grow into a worldwide
movement capable of launching terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe
is because they had years to reside, train and plan in “safe havens” where no one
would confront or attack them. Despite the strategic benefits of this argument for
the United States and the generally accepted idea that the battlefield of an armed
conflict exists wherever the enemy goes, this train of thought does raise a number
of concerns regarding the United States’ use of interstate force and whether or not
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such force is violating other states’ sovereignty. Article 51 of the UN Charter
states that a state, or state sponsored organization cannot use force in the territory
of another state, however, each state must be able to defend itself from attacks
originating from other states.50 Interstate force is legal if: the second state
consents to the use of force; the second state is directly responsible for the attack
against the first; or if the second state is unable or unwilling to prevent attacks by
organizations or individuals within its borders against the first.51 In the individual
countries that the United States has launched attacks, the United States claims that
Pakistan has given permission to use drones in their country,52 and that the
Yemeni, Somali and Libyan governments are not capable of dealing with the
threats posed by al-Qaeda within their borders.
The distinction between states in this instance is critical. Many would
argue that the United States’ claim of an armed conflict against al-Qaeda,
anywhere they would go, suggests that the United States believes that it could
legally strike anywhere that an al-Qaeda terrorist resides. Obviously, the
international community must maintain a principle of “sovereign equality” in the
writing, interpreting and implementing of international law where all countries are
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treated equally, but practically, most will acknowledge that that is simply not
realistic. The United States makes a legal argument that because of its right to
self-defense from Article 51 and the “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” it
has the right to target al-Qaeda terrorists whether they be in Pakistan or France.
Practically speaking, anyone with even the slightest understanding of international
politics and military strategy will realize that the United States would never
stretch the limits of its self-defense to conduct a drone strike in a nation such as
France. Moreover, no one would suggest that the “Authorization for Use of
Military Force” implies that because an al-Qaeda cell might reside in Paris, that
that should mean that there is an active armed conflict in Paris. A perfect
example of the distinction between the notion of “idealistic legality” and
“practical legality” would be that of Saudi Arabia, possibly the state with the
largest individual and organizational support for al-Qaeda, but also a state where
the United States has not used drones because of good relations between the
governments and the Saudis’ ability to fight al-Qaeda with their own military and
law enforcement assets.
Domestic law and various aspects of international law apply to the legal
ability of the United States to conduct drone strikes. A specific area of
international law called International Humanitarian Law (IHL)53 54 applies to all
uses of force in any context of an instance of self-defense, armed conflict or war.
International Humanitarian Law places specific and important limitations on the
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use of force by all states so that no state can endlessly target anyone without
regard to some type of code of conduct to guide their discretion. Even within the
scope of an armed conflict all parties55 must adhere to International Humanitarian
Law, and in some cases Human Rights Law.56 One cannot over-stress the
importance of this requirement, as it is the only limitation to a state’s actions
within the scope of an armed conflict and therefore International Humanitarian
Law must be followed to ensure that all attacks are necessary and protect civilians
as much as possible in the specific situation.57 With respect to targeted killings,
International Humanitarian Law states that all targets must be positively identified
as a “combatant” or a civilian who is “directly participating in hostilities,”
additionally, all attacks must be necessary and proportionate so that military gain
exceeds civilian harm and everything possible is done to minimize civilian
casualties.58 International Humanitarian Law applies to any armed conflict
against a state or a non-state group and the United States has claimed in their
limited statements about drone strikes that they are adhering to all International
Humanitarian Law requirements for all of their drone strikes.59
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Many human rights activists have recently attempted to argue that the
United States is wrongfully targeting civilians who assist al-Qaeda whether it be
directly or indirectly and are therefore in violation of International Humanitarian
Law. It is critical to identify exactly when a civilian becomes a combatant and
therefore a lawful target in an armed conflict. The claim that an individual can be
a civilian at home, protected by International Humanitarian Law, assist al-Qaeda
during the day as a combatant, and then return home and regain the status of
civilian and retain the protection afforded to civilians is nothing short of
ridiculous. Osama bin Laden would not have been considered a civilian shielded
by International Humanitarian Law, sitting in his home, even if he was not at that
moment working against the United States. David Glazier, a professor of law at
Loyola Law School, put it perfectly stating, “once an individual affiliates with
[an] armed force, they become a lawful object of attack, whether engaged in
battle...or even at home on leave with their family.” Glazier goes on to say that
International Humanitarian Law must be followed by protecting other civilians
around the individual, but to say that a person can be protected as a civilian by
International Humanitarian Law simply because they are not, in that instant,
directly conducting or assisting in an attack is completely counter-intuitive to
conducting and winning an armed conflict and indeed puts the civilian population
at risk by allowing al-Qaeda a legal loophole to hide within the civilian
population safe from attack.60 A civilian becomes a lawful target of force as soon
as he or she is connected and is assisting an enemy actor in an armed conflict.
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Unfortunately, the issue of distinguishing between civilians and lawful
targets becomes much more of a heated issue considering the fact that select U.S.
citizens have joined and are actively supporting al-Qaeda in its operations against
the United States. Although the idea of the U.S. government ordering a targeted
killing against a U.S. citizen is emotionally disturbing to many human rights
activists and U.S. citizens, from a legal standpoint it is a very simple issue. The
fact is simply this: U.S. citizenship does not immunize individual citizens who
affiliate and assist the United States’ enemies, including al-Qaeda, from trial and
the use of force. It is the affiliation of the individual, rather than the citizenship
that is significant.61 This was a legal precedent realized in World War II
following the Supreme Court decision of Ex Parte Quirin, in which the court
ruled that, “Citizens of the United States who associate themselves with the
military arm of an enemy government...are enemy belligerents within the meaning
of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”62 Human rights activists still have
argued that targeting a U.S. citizen is an extrajudicial killing, ignoring the results
of Ex Parte Quirin, but these activists need to recognize that fleeing from the
judicial process is not a right afforded to any individual in the scope of domestic
or international law. If the U.S. citizens, who the United States claim are aiding
al-Qaeda in its operations, are in fact innocent, then they should turn themselves
in to the nearest U.S. embassy and argue their case in court. It is not the desire of
the United States to kill these individuals, but to bring them to justice.
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Up to this point the issues of how the United States can legally justify its
drone campaign as well as who can be legally targeted have been addressed. The
question now is who within the United States’ government can conduct a drone
strike. The United States military has been mainly responsible for drone strikes in
the “hot battlefields” of Afghanistan and Iraq, while the Central Intelligence
Agency has secretly been using drones to target individuals in other countries like
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya. The United States military is universally
recognized in domestic and international law as legally able to use force against
an enemy in an armed conflict, and few individuals would argue that the United
States’ presence in Afghanistan and Iraq is anything but an armed conflict. The
debate stems from the question of whether or not the CIA, a civilian organization,
can legally participate in an armed conflict and conduct targeted killings.
The National Security Act of 1947 granted the CIA the power to conduct
“functions” related to the United States’ national security if the president or the
National Security Council ordered them to do so.63 Although this legislation
probably did not intend for targeted killings to be included in the term
“functions,” the CIA has been used to conduct similar operations throughout
history. Gerald Ford’s executive order preventing the CIA from conducting
assassinations, often offered as an argument against the CIA using drones, most
notably did not include any language regarding targeted killings.64 In more recent
history, George W. Bush created a “Kill or Capture” list, following the 9/11
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attacks, of individuals that he gave the CIA authority to pursue and use force
against around the world.65 This move was not new or unprecedented. In fact, in
the previous administration, Bill Clinton issued an executive order to create a
similar list of “specially designated targets,” which, at the time, included Osama
bin Laden.66 Additional precedent of the CIA’s legitimate use of force in an
armed conflict can be found in instances when the United States Congress
authorized covert action in the past and deemed it to be legal so long as the
Intelligence Committees are informed.67 Bill Banks, a professor of law and public
administration in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and
director of the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism also concluded
on this note that “intelligence laws permit the president broad discretion to utilize
the nation’s intelligence agencies to carry out national security operations,
implicitly including targeted killings.”

Legal Debates Regarding Targeted Killings and Use of Drones by
the United States
In the institutions of domestic and international law, in the United
States government and the United Nations, the importance of questioning new
policies and methods, especially with regard to warfare, cannot be dismissed
or regarded as “soft policy.” Having said this, the vast majority of the United
States legal defense of its drone use around the world is strong both in the
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realm of domestic and international law. There are those who would argue
against the concept that the United States is in an armed conflict or that they
are acting in self-defense. Generally speaking, their arguments are not
“wrong” but undervalue the meaning of the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force” and the inherent right of self-defense. There are those who would
argue more fine points of what the United States is doing, who generally have
more valid cases that will be briefly discussed in this section.
Most individuals who argue against United States drone campaign,
specifically in the U.S. armed conflict with al-Qaeda, do not argue that the armed
conflict does not exist, but that there are limits of the armed conflict. The first
way in which the armed conflict is attacked is the issue of who is being targeted
and the idea that only high or mid-to-high level leadership can legally be targeted.
This is more a question of strategy than legality, since the enemies of a state in an
armed conflict who can be labeled “combatants” are all legally susceptible to
targeted killing. The second legal concern of critics is that drones are legally only
limited to the “hot battlefields” of Afghanistan and Iraq. This “legal argument” is
in fact more of an ethical argument. The United States is in an armed conflict
with an organization that has spread to multiple states around the world and it is
therefore legal for the United States to target individuals of that organization in
those states. However, the United States must abide by the laws of sovereignty
and Article 51 of the UN Charter by asking for permission from the host nation or
attacking when the state is not willing or able to neutralize the threat posed within
its borders. This logic returns to the Pakistan versus France argument made
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earlier. The United States has the right to target al-Qaeda members and bring
them to justice. Should a target be in Pakistan, who grants the United States
permission to strike, then the United States has the right to target that individual
using drones; should a target reside in Paris, after informing French officials who
would never grant the United States consent to use drones within its borders, the
United States would provide intelligence that would lead to French officials
arresting the individual and bringing him or her to justice.
Arguments are still made regarding sovereignty, despite the United States
respecting and obeying all interstate force and sovereignty aspects of International
Humanitarian Law. One such argument is that the United States will not stop
with its strikes and will claim the right to conduct drone strikes anywhere in the
world, including within the United States. Despite being based on speculation,
emotion and utter fantasy, this argument has been made by numerous individuals
within the legal community in the United States and around the world. The fact is
that the United States has not and would not violate the sovereignty of another
nation using drones; additionally, the United States would not deploy a drone
when there is another option at its disposal such as allowing law enforcement to
deal with the issue. On that note, the United States would not use drones within
its own borders because of its ability to utilize its own law enforcement for such a
situation. Another issue that is constantly brought up is that the United States’
use of drones opens the door for other nations to use drones as well, more
specifically on U.S. soil. Of course the United States’ use of drones sets a
precedent for other parties to use them as well, they are legal weapons of war that
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other nations can use regardless of U.S. actions. More to the point, the idea that a
nation such as China, Russia, North Korea or Iran would exogenously deploy a
drone to attack a target within the United States ignores every other factor that
would go into a decision of that magnitude. It ignores current political relations
with the United States, it ignores the fact that the United States is in possession of
nuclear weapons, it ignores the fact that the United States has not used drones
against any of these nations and it ignores the fact that the United States has the
most powerful military in the world and that the United States would retaliate
against the aggressing actor.68 Saying that the acquisition of drones by other
nations makes the United States susceptible to attack is no different than
discussing the threat of nuclear weapons or stealth bombers being acquired by
other nations.

Conclusion
The prospect of being brought to court over a drone strike is more a
question of theory versus reality for the United States. In theory, there is a
possibility that an international court could reject the United States’ claim that it
is in an armed conflict and that it is obeying International Humanitarian Law. In
reality the chances of this happening are small and the chances that a state would
bring the case before a court is even smaller. The fact that most of the
information regarding the strikes is classified limits the ability of another state to
build a case against the U.S. and the consequences of doing so could be
68
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detrimental to political relations between the two nations.69 However, it is still a
major priority for the United States to obey international law because of the
United States’ desire for other countries to follow international law as well.
Having said this, the current state of international law that governs
military action is not an ideal one. The design of international law is ideal, where
the treaties and resolutions that compose it are continually updated throughout
history to meet the legal challenges that arise. However, the guiding principles of
international law are too broad, leaving much for interpretation and many of the
concepts within this body of law to become outdated. Currently, the idea of
political realism governs military action; that is to say that because there are
certain actions that the U.S. cannot undertake or which would not benefit the U.S.,
such as striking terrorists in Europe, that the U.S. will not. The United States is
arguably more ethical than other nations, certainly democracies tend to be more
ethical than autocracies, eliminating much of the potential for unethical behavior,
but this is not a situation that the world can afford to let stand. The incredibly
complex nature of international law includes too many loopholes, exceptions to
rules and concepts which were once applicable to most conflicts that are now up
for interpretation in most circumstances. All of the aforementioned flaws are
visible in the controversy over the United States’ drone use today and signals that
international law must advance in a legislative body rather than by precedent set
by actors on the battlefield. Until this occurs, new technology and tactics which
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are not specifically addressed in international law will continue to be governed by
the discretion of individual nations.

Strategy

“Wisdom is better than weapons of war.”
Ecclisastes 9:18
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Napoleon famously claimed that, “victory goes to the large battalion,”70
suggesting that the most powerful71 side in any conflict will prevail. History has
proved Napoleon wrong. Since 1800, strong actors have defeated weak actors in
70% of all conflicts; between 1960 and 1998 weak actors won 55% of the
conflicts.72 73 How can this be? The only explanation for this phenomenon is
that, given certain situations, power is not a variable, or not the only variable, in
determining the outcome of a conflict.

Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Warfare Theory
In a conventional war, there are two or more state actors who employ their
various conventional and unconventional military units to engage each other.
Each actor has considerable resources, though there may be an imbalance in
strength or resources between the various actors. Any of the actors can start a
conventional war. More than likely, one actor will have a strategic “home
advantage.” In a conventional war, the objective is to utilize terrain on the
battlefield, to employ superior firepower and manpower to destroy the enemy’s
military forces. Ultimately, the more of the enemy that are killed, and the more
key terrain that is seized and held, the better. A conventional war will end when
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one side can no longer effectively attack the other, it can no longer defend itself, it
may not be able to economically sustain wartime operations, it may become
overrun by the enemy or both sides may reach some type of agreement to end the
conflict. Regardless of how it ends, it will be complete when one side proves
itself to be too strong for the other to defeat or both sides find it more beneficial to
stop the conflict.
An insurgency-based war is unrecognizable, compared to a conventional
war. In such a war, there are two sides: the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.
The insurgent has its own independent cause, which it stands for and supports.
This cause is directed against the current government in an effort to overthrow it
and establish its own authority.74 Regardless of the specific intentions of a
particular insurgent, all insurgents stand to disrupt the status quo in some way.
The counterinsurgent is a supporter of the current government, if not the current
government itself. The counterinsurgent’s strategy is to oppose whatever the
insurgent’s strategy is, literally to “counter” the insurgent.
The insurgent and the counterinsurgent, although in the same conflict with
each other, fight different wars, with different abilities and rules. In terms of
material resources, the counterinsurgent holds a massive advantage. The
counterinsurgent is a legitimate authority, holds power and influence, maintains a
trained and well supplied military, and has an economy to fund its endeavors.75 In
terms of “intangible advantages,” the counterinsurgent is at a significant
disadvantage. The insurgent develops a cause to mobilize a base following, the
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stronger this cause, the more of an advantage that the insurgent possesses. The
insurgent is also free of any of the responsibility that the counterinsurgent is
burdened with.76 The counterinsurgent must consistently provide services,
particularly security to the local population and cannot falter in its ability to do so.
Because of this imbalance, it would be reckless of the insurgent to attack, or allow
themselves to be attacked, by the counterinsurgent in an open battle. As the
insurgent grows in power and success, the counterinsurgent will shrink; the initial
imbalance of power and the manner in which it changes is one of the primary
characteristics that separates insurgent warfare from conventional warfare.77
As previously mentioned, conventional war focuses on the destruction of
the enemy and the holding of decisive terrain, which insurgent warfare does not.
In such a war, the counterinsurgent has dominion over virtually all terrain within
its boarders, though a strong insurgent presence may exist in certain areas. What
is contrary to conventional warfare theory is that, in insurgent warfare, the
battlefield is not a piece of land, but the local population who resides on it.78 The
war is won or lost based, not on how many enemy are killed, but on who can gain
and control networks and information on the battlefield. In other words, who can
gain and sustain the trust of the local population, and control how the population
conducts itself. The locals can accept the insurgent and ultimately shield him
from the aggressive intentions of the counterinsurgent, or they can give
intelligence over to the counterinsurgent that will ultimately end in the destruction
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of the insurgent. The population will do this according to what will benefit them
most, but it is important to emphasize that the cooperation of the local population
does not have to be by choice.79 The locals may choose the best option at hand,
so long as it is more beneficial than the alternative, or forcing the local population
to choose one side, though not the best outcome, is still an option for both actors.
The tactics of insurgent warfare reveal just how different the points of
view are between the two sides. The counterinsurgent cannot exist independent
of the presence of an insurgent, there must be an insurgent for there to be a
counterinsurgent.80 In this way, only an insurgent can initiate the conflict. This
gives the insurgent the advantage of choosing an opportune moment to begin the
struggle. As stated earlier, one of the insurgent’s strongest weapons is the cause
that they create for themselves. If it is strong enough, and exposes a major
societal problem that the counterinsurgent has created, or failed to resolve, it will
draw massive and passionate support. Should the insurgent’s cause be weak or
short-lived, the insurgent will be unsuccessful. The insurgent will politically
reach out to the population to gain their support, or threaten them into supporting
them. Additionally, the insurgent will attack the trust that the population has with
the counterinsurgent. It will disrupt the natural order and create chaos to show
that the counterinsurgent is incompetent and unable to protect the population.
The insurgent is fluid in its movements, objectives and operations and will use hit
and run tactics so that the counterinsurgent cannot respond effectively.
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The counterinsurgent is rigid in almost every way. It must adhere to its
responsibilities and maintain its assets constantly, unlike the insurgent who can
cease operations for a time if it desires. The insurgent’s ability to create disorder
is relatively easy, inexpensive and at low risk of a loss.81 A simple grenade
thrown into a market place causes disorder, makes the local population question
the ability of the counterinsurgent and costs next to nothing in terms of financial
costs or potential risk. The counterinsurgent’s objective to maintain order and
security is difficult, expensive and will present risks to agents of the
counterinsurgent.82 It is because of the relatively low cost of insurgency and the
difficulty that the counterinsurgent has of catching the insurgent that insurgent
conflicts are generally prolonged conflicts. The lack of any decisive engagement
removes the possibility of one side defeating the other quickly. In rare cases,
counterinsurgencies fall quickly, but only due to their own internal problems.83
Never has an insurgency completely crumbled early in a conflict.84

Victory in an Insurgent Conflict
Insurgent warfare is clearly not based solely on which side is most
powerful. By its nature, insurgent warfare is a struggle between a strong
counterinsurgent and a weak insurgent. Given that weak actors have won 30% of
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total conflicts in history and 55% of conflicts between 1960 and 1998,85 factors
other than power must play a decisive role in the outcome of an insurgent based
conflict.
Andrew Mack’s model to predict who is more likely to win a conflict
between asymmetric actors suggests that the greater the gap in power is between
the strong and the weak actors, the more secure of his survival the strong actor
will become.86 This sense of security will impact the strong actor’s relative
interest in the conflict, increasing the actor’s political vulnerability. In other
words, the idea that the strong actor is not fighting for his survival, combined with
a prolonged conflict or a string of strategic failures, will ultimately diminish the
strong actor’s ability to continue the conflict. This model is fundamentally
incomplete. It does not explain variation of conflict outcomes over time, nor does
it explain why extremely strong actors do defeat extremely weak actors in
conflicts throughout history. Mack’s “Power Gap Model” is a good general
predictor of how a strong actor can lose the political will to continue an
asymmetric conflict. Power seems to be a variable in the type of war and strategy
that will be seen, while the will to win is a variable that will determine the
outcome, strategy87 and tactics88 play an extremely influential role.
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The fact that conventional warfare tactics are ineffective in this style of
warfare runs in parallel with the concept that the battlefield of this conflict is the
population. Recognizing the reality that the counterinsurgent’s greatest strength
is his power, strength and resources, he would be best fit for conventional
warfare. How then can the counterinsurgent not rely on these abilities, and how
can he win if he does not?
Winning the favor of the population will win the conflict. With any issue,
there will be a small minority who support it, a large majority who are neutral or
indifferent and a small minority who are opposed to it.89 It will be the objective
of the counterinsurgent to maintain the support of the minority who supports him
and mobilize them to win over the indifferent and neutral population. Security is
a major issue for the population but the counterinsurgent must also radiate an
image that he will ultimately defeat the insurgent.90 In the end, a decisive victory
will be achieved by the counterinsurgent when he is able to effectively separate
the local population from the insurgents.91
Counterinsurgencies throughout history have shown that they do not take
any set form or conduct themselves in any specific way other than to say that the
“counterinsurgency will mirror the state that is conducting it.”92 That is to say,
typically counterinsurgencies in authoritarian states tend to be more brutal,
counterinsurgencies in democratic states tend to be far too eager to turn things
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over to the local authorities before they are prepared to do so. Although the
counterinsurgency itself is dependent on the state conducting it, there are two
fundamentals that all counterinsurgencies must establish if they are to be
successful: (1) a detailed knowledge of the local area, population and what drives
the conflict; (2) an attitude that puts the security and safety of the local population
above all else, even killing the insurgent.93 The local population is fixed as it is,
but the insurgent is fluid and constantly moving. If the counterinsurgent can
discriminate between the population and the insurgent, it can implement a strategy
designed to extract the insurgent from the population. Theoretically, if a
counterinsurgent accomplishes this objective, the insurgent will have no choice
but to engage in open combat because its goal to win the population will be
severely compromised.
In the beginning of the Afghanistan conflict, there was a clear
disagreement between high level U.S. leaders who, for political reasons, argued
that they were in a conventional invasion and occupation; and small unit military
leaders on the ground who realized that they were not in any type of conventional
war that they had been trained to fight.94 President George W. Bush claimed that
the United States was in a “War on Terror,” unwilling to acknowledge that
terrorism is a tactic used, not an enemy to be destroyed. The mentality was
simple: terrorism, by its very nature, strikes fear into those who experience it and
is often described as evil. Easily justifying why the United States would want to
go to war with an evil entity.
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The United States does not negotiate with terrorists. The main goal of
terrorism is to achieve their goals by utilizing fear as a weapon. Insurgencies are
not evil, the United States seeks to “win the hearts and minds” of insurgents to
bring them to a similar way of thinking. In fact, western culture often celebrates
peaceful insurgents such as Mohandas Gandhi.95 The problem with insurgents is
not their ideology, it is the methods of violence that they use to achieve their
goals. To eliminate the ideology of an insurgent is to destroy the insurgent, while
the only way to destroy a terrorist is by capturing or killing him. The Bush
Administration and, in particular, the United States military began to see the error
in their ways, moving to acknowledge the insurgency that they were fighting,
writing the current counterinsurgency doctrine and focusing more on the local
population than on the enemy.

The Drone’s Place in Counterinsurgency
The United States is clearly the strong actor in its conflict with al-Qaeda.
Moreover, there could not be a larger power gap than the one that exists between
the United States, the current superpower, and al-Qaeda, a loosely affiliated
network of insurgents. Suggesting that the United States, according to Mack’s
model, is likely to lose interest and political resolve in the conflict should it be
prolonged or marked by strategic failures. The United States’ decade long
conflict in the Middle East has stretched long enough to be considered
“prolonged,” and setbacks have been experienced throughout that time.
Following in line with Mack’s predictions, discussion of a “timetable for
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withdrawal” has been constantly present in the political theatre, even becoming a
major topic of debate in presidential elections.
The United States’ current counterinsurgency is far more nuanced than it
was in the early 2000s. A focus on fighting for the population has replaced the
previous focus on killing the enemy and seizing terrain. Heavy utilization of
conventional forces is shifting to a heavy use of special operations forces. Most
importantly, conventional warfare techniques have been replaced with new
methods like human terrain mapping and targeted killing. The United States is a
counterinsurgent, and the United States is limited in the same theoretical ways
that all counterinsurgents are. The United States’ conventional forces will never
be as fast as the al-Qaeda insurgents, they will not know the local population as
well and, most significantly, the United States is not without weakness in interest
and political resolve.96 However, drones have been one of the tactics that has
evened the odds for the United States in the current conflict.
The drone’s reconnaissance ability is absolutely essential in a conflict, but
particularly in the type of conflict that the United States finds itself in today. It is
paramount for the counterinsurgent to be capable of monitoring the movements
and activities of the local population in the conflict. The ability to do this allows
the counterinsurgent to differentiate between civilians, who must be protected and
reached out to, and insurgents, who must be isolated from the population. Drones
are perfectly suited to these types of aerial reconnaissance missions. Their ability
to fly at low speeds and view the situation on the ground with such clarity allows
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the operator to collect more intelligence related to the activities and movements of
individuals on the ground that traditional aircraft would not be incapable of.
Additionally, the longer flight time of drones permits a more complete and
thorough observation of an area.
Its clear that reconnaissance is a primary mission of drones worldwide.
The United States lost a model RQ-170 “Sentinel” stealth drone, a model
previously not known to have existed, when it crashed inside the borders of Iran.97
This incident reveals a number of critical aspects with regard to the United States’
drone program and the strategy that it is using to employ drones. First, that
drones are being manufactured on a much more advanced level, technologically
speaking, than was previously thought. The existence of a stealth drone, while
not exactly surprising, does show that the technology being used in conjunction
with drones is constantly evolving. Given that drones are relatively new, the
world can expect to see further advances in drone technology. The second
striking fact that this incident sheds light on is that the drone crashed in Iran. The
United States government claims that the drone was flying along the AfghanistanIran border, where they lost control of it and crashed in Iran.98 It cannot be
proven one way or the other, but it is safe to say that the drone was probably
observing some area within the Iranian border. Given this information, it is not
unimaginable to think that the United States may also have stealth drones flying
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over North Korea, Pakistan and other nations worldwide without that
government’s consent or knowledge. Throwing aside the ethical debate presented
in this situation, the existence of a small stealth drone reconnaissance program
that monitors key areas worldwide would be a critical piece of the United States’
intelligence collecting ability. One that would allow the United States to monitor
potential “problem areas” of the world, rather than use conventional, invasive
means to ensure security. This is a program that most certainly will continue to
be supported in the future.
In 1964, a french military officer named David Galula wrote a
counterinsurgency theory that was greatly relied upon for the current
counterinsurgency theory written for the Afghanistan conflict by the United States
military. With regard to targeted killings, Galula concluded that, “targeted killing
campaigns offer little hope of an eventual defeat of the insurgency because more
will rise to replace the insurgents who are targeted.”99 Immediately prior to the
9/11 attacks, Ivan Arreguin-Toft produced his work on asymmetric warfare theory
in which he too concluded that “strategic bombing campaigns” are rarely effective
and generally tend toward barbarism.100 In the beginning of the Afghanistan
conflict, David Kilcullen, author of much of the United States’ current
counterinsurgency doctrine including the famous, “28 Articles,”101 considered to
be the Holy Grail of modern counterinsurgency theory, concurred with Galula and
99

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 1964, 2006. Print.
100
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict."
International Security 26.1 (2001): 93-128. Print.
101
Kilcullen, David. "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level
Counterinsurgency." 3/2006 2006.Web.
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/28_Articles_of_COINKilcullen%28Mar06%29.pdf>.

51
Arreguin-Toft. Kilcullen pushed for the strategy of attacking the insurgency’s
ideology rather than the insurgents themselves. He suggested, with regards to
targeted killing programs, that although some insurgents cannot be turned and
therefore will eventually need to be hunted down,102 that if the act of engaging
highly valued targets comes in conflict with gaining the trust of the population
that a targeted killing program would not be beneficial to the counterinsurgent.103
Theoretically speaking, Galula, Arreguin-Toft and Kilcullen’s view on
targeted killing programs is the generally accepted conclusion on how effective a
program such as drone striking would be if a counterinsurgent were to employ
one against an insurgent. The United States’ counterinsurgency doctrine preaches
the importance of protecting the local population and how less emphasis should
be placed on engaging the enemy, yet the United States’ drone targeting program
has continued to grow for as long as the conflict has persisted. How could such a
fundamental conflict between theory and practice exist in the United States’
conflict with al-Qaeda? The United States is a rational actor, it would choose a
course of action that would bring positive utility as opposed to using a tactic that
would ultimately harm its strategic objectives. Therefore, the United States’ use
of drones can be explained in one of two ways. First, that any negative effects
produced by the drone program are eventually outweighed by the positive effects
of either the drone program itself104 or the United States’ counterinsurgency
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strategy as a whole. Or second, that counterinsurgency theory’s prediction that
targeted killing programs will ultimately fail is based on the traditional methods
of conducting such a program,105 as opposed to drones. It is possible that drones
are so precise and so advanced that the negative consequences that targeted killing
programs would have produced in the past simply do not exist when drones are
used.
Peter Bergen’s study of drones concluded that 326 drone strikes have been
conducted in Pakistan since the first known use of drones by the United States in
that country. Bergen estimates that between 1,402 and 2,184 militants have been
killed since 2004, and between 293 and 471 civilian casualties have resulted in the
drone strikes in that same time period.106 Graph 1 shows the relationship between
the total amount of drone strikes estimated to have been conducted in Pakistan
and the amount of civilian casualties and militant deaths that occurred as a
result.107 The graph shows a direct correlation between the amount of drones
strikes conducted and the amount of militant deaths that occurred. This should
come as no surprise, drones are sent out on missions to target militants so one
would expect this relationship to exist. However, no correlation seems to exist
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between the total amount of drone strikes and civilian casualties over time,
illustrating no direct relation between the frequency of drone use and the amount
of civilian casualties that occur. This is significant in that drones are proven
capable of avoiding contact with civilians, other factors must contribute to the
amounts of civilian casualties such as the quality of available intelligence.

The data points to an average ratio of 1.359 civilian casualties per drone strike
over the seven year period. While there is no data to compare to other weapon
systems, this data does show that drones are effective at discriminating between
militants and civilians on the battlefield on a relatively accurate and consistent
basis over time.
Bergen goes even further in his study by tallying the total amount of
“militant leaders” who were killed in these strikes, and concludes that 43 have
been killed since 2004.108 Graph 2 shows the relationship between the number of
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drone strikes that occurred in Pakistan and the amount of militant leader deaths
that drones have been responsible for since 2004. Although in 2008, the amount
of militant leaders killed spiked, the amount of militant leader deaths has been
relatively consistent with the amount of drone strikes that have taken place.
Although 43 militant leader deaths appears to be a minuscule amount, consider
that the al-Qaeda network can only have so many individuals that can fit the role
of a highly valued leader, and therefore the number of these types of deaths, by
the nature of the targets, will be small. The data from this chart indicates, first,
that there is a direct correlation between the amount of drone strikes conducted
and the amount of militant deaths that result. More specifically, the data reveals
that it takes an average of 7.581 drone strikes to produce one militant leader death
over the past seven year period of drone use. This value takes into consideration a
great deal more than simply how many drone strikes occurred in that time.
Variables such as intelligence, strategic victories and failures, mistakes on the part
of militant leaders and even chance come into play in the hunting of a small list of
militant leaders. Having said this, the data clearly shows that al-Qaeda and its
affiliates’ networks of leaders have greatly suffered as a result of drones being
implemented in the hunt for these individuals.
To say that targeted killing programs, historically, do not yield impressive
results for the counterinsurgent is accurate, but to say that the United States’
drone program is not achieving results is not accurate. Drones clearly are
producing results for the United States in reconnaissance ability, human terrain
mapping, targeting hundreds of low to mid-level leaders and targeting over 30
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highly valued al-Qaeda leaders.109 Results can also be seen in the operational
capacity that al-Qaeda has dropped to in recent years. Al-Qaeda’s major attacks
plotted against the west in the last decade have been the World Trade Center
attacks in the United States in 2001, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the
London subway bombings in 2005 and a foiled attempt to bomb a U.S.-bound
plane by Umar Farouk Abdulmatallab in 2009.110 Major attempts to strike the
west have decreased dramatically after 2005, right when drone use began.
Attempts since 2005 have been mostly limited to the Middle East, as opposed to
2005 and prior where the reach of al-Qaeda clearly stretched worldwide.
Additionally, the plots after 2005 have generally become smaller in the potential
for casualties and incorporated less planning.111

・

・

The disparity between United States counterinsurgency theory and
practice is somewhat shocking at a first glance. Counterinsurgency theory based
on the actions of counterinsurgents historically lead experts to believe that drone
striking would be a strategy that is doomed to failure, while the reconnaissance
ability of drones is shown to be invaluable for any counterinsurgent. The United
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States has employed the drone in a targeted killing campaign against al-Qaeda
despite this theoretical conclusion, and while it can be argued that drones are
causing negative effects and not combating al-Qaeda’s insurgent ideology, there
is little doubt that drones have largely contributed to the elimination of numerous
al-Qaeda leadership members and al-Qaeda’s inability to move, train and conduct
operations in the ways that it did prior to their use.
It is impossible to determine the direct, quantitative affect of drones on alQaeda’s operational capacity or the severity of negative side effects that they
produce.112 Having acknowledged this fact, on a qualitative level, the assertions
made in this section are valid, given the estimated performance of drones and the
weakened ability of al-Qaeda to strike in the United States and Europe.113
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The Future of Drone Warfare

“The belief that peace is desirable is rarely enough to achieve it.”
Barack Obama
Speech at His Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize

As the United States’ debt has climbed, approaching a level equal to its
annual gross domestic product, and following the global economic crisis
witnessed in 2008, talk of limiting government spending has been at the forefront
of political debate. Most notably, and at the highest level of controversy, defense
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spending has not been taken off of the table. Early in 2012, President Obama and
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta developed a new “military approach” that would
ultimately shrink the U.S. military and attempt to reduce spending as much as
possible. This should come as no surprise; with the end of U.S. presence in Iraq
and a plan to withdraw from Afghanistan currently being implemented, it is only
logical that the additional troops and funding needed to conduct these conflicts
will no longer be necessary.
The president’s plan has come up against strong opposition, certainly for
political reasons, but also because of the lack of certainty that the United States
will be safe with a smaller military that, within a few years, will not be
conducting operations in Afghanistan. The primary reason, as cited by the 9/11
Commission Report, that al-Qaeda had the ability to conduct the September 11,
2001 attacks was the availability of a safe-haven that allowed them freedom of
movement to train and prepare.114 By this vary logic, the president’s plan is
immediately put into question based on the fact that if the United States
withdraws from Afghanistan, and the Middle East region in general, terrorist
organizations could take claim to another safe-haven. This is the inherent
problem of leaving Afghanistan. Will the United States ever be able to leave the
Middle East for fear that it will again become a breeding ground to insurgent
movements, warlords and terrorist organizations?
It is most definitely in the best interest of the United States to end its
conflicts in the Middle East and withdraw its conventional forces. The president
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is caught in a dilemma between limiting government spending and ensuring
security for the United States. In President Obama’s reevaluation of the military,
he expressed slight concern over the al-Qaeda cells that currently exist in
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and in other parts of the region,
suggesting that he fully recognizes the presence of a threat. The president also
emphasized that these cells should be monitored and met with offensive force
when they are deemed to be dangerous enough to merit such action, stating,
“whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint
approaches to achieve our security objectives....”115 This type of a statement,
particularly in a document that outlines the future military strategy for the United
States, suggests a great deal of investment and utilization of drones. Further
evidence of this can be found in the media where, following the release of the
president’s plan, numerous unnamed defense officials were quoted stating that
this would ultimately mean a heavier use of special operations forces and drone
aircraft to target those cells who actually pose a threat to the continental United
States.116
Multiple times in both Panetta and Obama’s descriptions of the new
direction that they will take the military in they used the phrase, “agile, flexible,
ready and technologically advanced,” to describe the shape that the military will
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take.117 While this would be a good description of a military no longer occupying
two nations simultaneously, it also is in line with the president’s goal of the
restructuring and, “being able to fight a single large-scale war while retaining
enough forces to deter or impose ‘unacceptable costs on an opportunistic
aggressor in a second region.’”118
Neither Panetta nor Obama openly state their specific intentions for how
they will continue to engage al-Qaeda in the future, nor do they discuss in detail
how operations in the Middle East will be conducted. This will prove to be one of
the greatest challenges for the United States foreign policy and military strategy
over the next decade. How to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates from launching
attacks while maintaining a presence in the rest of the world and controlling
defense spending? Both Obama and Panetta devoted a great deal of their
statements to this topic, mainly oriented toward less than conventional measures.
It is clear that Obama and Panetta do not wish to continue to engage al-Qaeda or
insurgent organizations with the full force of the conventional military for much
longer. What then will be the method in which al-Qaeda is combated and stopped
if they continue to be a threat to the United States?
Although it is impossible to state with absolute certainty what the United
States’ course of action will be with regard to al-Qaeda in the future, there is no
doubt that drones will become a significant, if not central, part of it. Countless
117
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counterinsurgency strategies and military strategists have hypothesized that
targeted killing programs cannot succeed as a strategy to defeat an insurgent. At
the same time, drones have also been cited as one of the most powerful and
effective tools in the United States’ counter-network operations, for their
reconnaissance and targeting abilities as well as the psychological effect that they
have on the insurgents. Given these two conflicting ideas, it can easily be
expected that drones will be heavily used to monitor the activity and ability of
insurgent groups in nations such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and
others with al-Qaeda presence. Should these cells strengthen themselves and
become dangerous to allies in the region, Europe or to the United States, there is
little doubt that the United States will disrupt their activities in some way.
With respect to the United States’ drone targeting program, it is relatively
clear that the program will continue at some level. It is strategically important for
the United States to have a list of select, critical leaders of the insurgency to
constantly be tracking and/or hunting. More in line with current
counterinsurgency theory, the president’s rhetoric suggests that the targeting
program may lighten up on mid-to-low level leaders. Returning to the legality
portion of this thesis, it would be significantly more difficult to justify such a
targeting campaign on mid-to-low level insurgent actors. Once the United States’
conventional forces are moved out of Afghanistan, it will essentially mark the end
of the armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda and therefore will
end the United States’ ability to target al-Qaeda as freely. Instead, the United
States will have to individually justify that each target presents a threat to the
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United States, which for the most part will only be possible with high level
leaders and cells in the process of mobilizing for a strike against the United
States.

・

・

Drones entered the worldwide stage nearly a decade ago, initially outside
of public knowledge, and have continuously proved to be one of the most
significant technological advancements in warfare to date. Following their
inception, they sparked awe, debate and even fear; making the world wonder for a
brief moment if drones would extract the “human element” from war. Instead
they have been the tool that has helped to redefine how a counterinsurgent can
properly engage an insurgent. Drones have afforded the United States the ability
to effectively track and combat al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations as a whole
and on an individual level in ways that are infinitely more effective than the
United States has been able to do in previous conflicts with similar enemies.
With the United States’ strategy to remove conventional forces from the
Middle East, drones will prove to be infinitely more important in the United
States’ objective to eliminate al-Qaeda’s networking and operational abilities.
The drone’s reconnaissance and targeting abilities may be utilized as a way to
monitor al-Qaeda and simply strike when they become too strong or their reach
grows too large. In this way, drones, in conjunction with special operations
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forces, have given the United States a feasible alternative to maintaining a
conventional presence in the Middle East.
Drones are an incredible advancement. Their application - broad; their
abilities - many; the fear that they strike - paralyzing; the havoc they wreak devastating; their future potential - limitless.
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APPENDIX A - Text of the “Authorization for Use of Military Force”119
Text of S.J. Res. 23 as passed September 14, 2001, and signed into law
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for
the recent attacks launched against the United States.
Whereas on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed
against the United States and its citizens;
Whereas such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States
exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at
home and abroad;
Whereas in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States posed by these grave acts of violence;
Whereas such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States; and
119
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Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter
and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States; Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force.”
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES.
(a) IN GENERAL. — That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons.
(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS —
(1) SPECIFIC ST A TUTORY AUTHORIZATION — Consistent with section
8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this resolution
supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
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APPENDIX B - U.S. Air Force MQ-1B PREDATOR FACT SHEET120
Mission
The MQ-1B Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aircraft
system. The Predator's primary missions are close air support, air interdiction, and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. It acts as a Joint Forces Air
Component Commander-owned theater asset for reconnaissance, surveillance and
target acquisition in support of the Joint Forces Commander.
Features
The MQ-1B Predator is a system, not just an aircraft. A fully operational system
consists of four aircraft (with sensors and weapons), a ground control station, or
GCS, a Predator Primary Satellite Link, or PPSL, and spare equipment along with
operations and maintenance crews for deployed 24-hour operations.
The basic crew for the Predator is a rated pilot to control the aircraft and
command the mission and an enlisted aircrew member to operate sensors and
weapons plus a mission coordinator, when required. The crew employs the
aircraft from inside the GCS via a line-of-sight data link or a satellite data link for
beyond line-of-sight operations.
The MQ-1B Predator carries the Multi-spectral Targeting System, or MTS-A,
which integrates an infrared sensor, a color/monochrome daylight TV camera, an
image-intensified TV camera, a laser designator and a laser illuminator into a
120
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single package. The full motion video from each of the imaging sensors can be
viewed as separate video streams or fused together. The aircraft can employ two
laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles which possess a highly accurate, low
collateral damage, and anti-armor and anti-personnel engagement capability.
The system can be deployed for worldwide operations. The Predator aircraft can
be disassembled and loaded into a container for travel. The ground control
system and PPSL are transportable in a C-130 Hercules (or larger) transport
aircraft. The Predator can operate on a 5,000 by 75 foot (1,524 meters by 23
meters) hard surface runway with clear line-of-sight to the ground data terminal
antenna. The antenna provides line-of-sight communications for takeoff and
landing. The PPSL provides over-the-horizon communications for the aircraft and
sensors.
An alternate method of employment, Remote Split Operations, employs a
GCS for takeoff and landing operations at the forward operating location while
the CONUS based crew executes the mission via beyond-line-of-sight links.
The aircraft has an ARC-210 radio, an APX-100 IFF/SIF with Mode 4, and an
upgraded turbocharged engine. The latest upgrades, which enhance maintenance
and performance, include notched tails, split engine cowlings, braided steel hoses
and improved engine blocks.
Background
The Predator system was designed in response to a Department of Defense
requirement to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
information combined with a kill capability to the warfighter.
In April 1996, the secretary of defense selected the U.S. Air Force as the
operating service for the RQ-1 Predator system. The "R" is the Department of
Defense designation for reconnaissance aircraft. The "M" is the DOD designation
for multi-role, and "Q" means unmanned aircraft system. The "1" refers to the
aircraft being the first of the series of remotely piloted aircraft systems.
A change in designation from "RQ-1" to "MQ-1" occurred in 2002 with the
addition of the AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, enabling reaction against ISR, CAS
and interdiction targets.
Active-duty operational squadrons are the 15th and 17th Reconnaissance
Squadrons at Creech Air Force Base, Nev. Another unit at Creech AFB, the 11th
RS, is the formal training unit and provides initial training for MQ-1B crews. The
6th RS is standing up as a second FTU at Holloman AFB, N. M. Air Force
Reserve Command operates the 78th RS also from Creech AFB. The Air National
Guard operates the 111th RS in Texas, the 178th RS in North Dakota, the 196th
RS in California and the 214th RS in Arizona.
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General Characteristics
Primary Function: Armed reconnaissance, airborne surveillance and target
acquisition
Contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.
Power Plant: Rotax 914F four cylinder engine
Thrust: 115 horsepower
Wingspan: 55 feet (16.8 meters)
Length: 27 feet (8.22 meters)
Height: 6.9 feet (2.1 meters)
Weight: 1,130 pounds ( 512 kilograms) empty
Maximum takeoff weight: 2,250 pounds (1,020 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity: 665 pounds (100 gallons)
Payload: 450 pounds (204 kilograms)
Speed: Cruise speed around 84 mph (70 knots), up to 135 mph
Range: Up to 770 miles (675 nautical miles)
Ceiling: Up to 25,000 feet (7,620 meters)
Armament: Two laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles
Crew (remote): Two (pilot and sensor operator)
Initial operational capability: March 2005
Unit Cost: $20 million (fiscal 2009 dollars) (includes four aircraft, a ground
control station and a Predator Primary Satellite Link)
Inventory: Active force, 130; ANG, 8; Reserve, 0
Point of Contact
Air Combat Command, Public Affairs Office; 130 Andrews St., Suite 202;
Langley AFB, VA 23665-1987; DSN 574-5007 or 757-764-5007; e-mail:
accpa.operations@langley.af.mil
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APPENDIX C - U.S. AIR FORCE MQ-9 REAPER FACT SHEET121
Mission
The MQ-9 Reaper is a medium-to-high altitude, long endurance unmanned
aircraft system. The Reaper's primary missions are close air support, air
interdiction, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. It acts as a
Joint Forces Air Component Commander-owned theater asset for reconnaissance,
surveillance and target acquisition in support of the Joint Forces Commander.
Features
The MQ-9 is a system, not just an aircraft. A fully operational system consists of
several air vehicles (with sensors and weapons), a ground control station, or
GCS, a Predator Primary Satellite Link, or PPSL, and spare equipment along
with operations and maintenance crews for deployed locations.
The basic crew consists of a rated pilot to control the aircraft and command the
mission and an enlisted aircrew member to operate sensors and weapons plus a
mission coordinator, when required. To meet combatant commanders'
requirements, the Reaper delivers tailored capabilities using mission kits that may
contain various weapons and sensor payload combinations.
The MQ-9 baseline system carries the Multi-spectral Targeting System, or MTSB, which has a robust suite of sensors for targeting. The MTS-B integrates an
infrared sensor, a color/ monochrome daylight TV camera, an image-intensified
TV camera, a laser designator and a laser illuminator into a single package. The
full motion video from each of the imaging sensors can be viewed as separate
video streams or fused together.
The unit also incorporates a laser rangefinder/designator which provides the
capability to precisely designate targets for laser-guided munitions; such as the
GBU-12 Paveway II. The Reaper is also equipped with a synthetic aperture
radar to enable GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions targeting. The MQ-9B can
also employ four laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles which possess a highly
accurate, low collateral damage, anti-armor and anti-personnel engagement
capability.
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Each MQ-9 aircraft system can be disassembled and loaded into a single container
for deployment worldwide. The entire system can be transported in the C-130
Hercules or larger aircraft. The MQ-9 aircraft operates from standard U.S.
airfields with clear line-of-sight to the ground data terminal antenna
which provides line-of-sight communications for takeoff and landing. The PPSL
provides over-the-horizon communications for the aircraft and sensors.
An alternate method of employment, Remote Split Operations, employs a GCS
for takeoff and landing operations at the forward operating location, while the
CONUS-based crew executes the mission via beyond-line-of-sight links.
Background
The U.S. Air Force proposed the MQ-9 system in response to the Department of
Defense request for Global War on Terrorism initiatives. It is larger and more
powerful than the MQ-1 Predator and is designed to go after time-sensitive targets
with persistence and precision, and destroy or disable those targets. The "M" is
the Department of Defense designation for multi-role and "Q" means unmanned
aircraft system. The "9" indicates it is the ninth in the series of remotely piloted
aircraft systems.
The MQ-9 is operated by the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 42nd Attack
Squadron, both at Creech Air Force Base, Nev., and the 29th Attack Squadron at
Holloman AFB, N.M.
General Characteristics
Primary Function: Unmanned hunter/killer weapon system
Contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
Power Plant: Honeywell TPE331-10GD turboprop engine
Thrust: 900 shaft horsepower maximum
Wingspan: 66 feet (20.1 meters)
Length: 36 feet (11 meters)
Height: 12.5 feet (3.8 meters)
Weight: 4,900 pounds (2,223 kilograms) empty
Maximum takeoff weight: 10,500 pounds (4,760 kilograms)
Fuel Capacity: 4,000 pounds (602 gallons)
Payload: 3,750 pounds (1,701 kilograms)
Speed: Cruise speed around 230 miles per hour (200 knots)
Range: 1,150 miles (1,000 nautical miles)
Ceiling: Up to 50,000 feet (15,240 meters)
Armament: Combination of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, GBU-12 Paveway
II and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions
Crew (remote): Two (pilot and sensor operator)
Unit Cost: $53.5 million (includes four aircraft with sensors) (fiscal 2006 dollars)
Initial operating capability: October 2007
Inventory: Active force, 47; ANG, 1; Reserve, 0
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Point of Contact
Air Combat Command, Public Affairs Office; 130 Andrews St., Suite 202;
Langley AFB, VA 23665-1987; DSN 574-5007 or 757-764-5007; e-mail:
accpa.operations@langley.af.mil
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APPENDIX D - Map of Afghanistan-Pakistan Boarder with Known Drone
Strikes122

APPENDIX E - Known Militant Leaders Killed by Drones123
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October 27, 2011: Khan Mohammad, Maulvi Nazir's deputy commander
(Reuters)
October 13, 2011: Janbaz Zadran, senior Haqqani commander (NYT)
September 11, 2011: Abu Hafs al-Shahri (NYT).
August 22, 2011: Atiyah Abd al-Rahman (AP)
June 3, 2011: Ilyas Kashmiri, al-Qaeda's commander in Pakistan (BBC)
February 20, 2011: Abu Zaid al-Iraqi, managed al-Qaeda’s finances in
Pakistan (AP)

December 17, 2010: Ibne Amin, al-Qaeda linked Swat Taliban
commander (The News)
December 17, 2010: Ali Marjan, local LeI commander (CNN, ET)
September 25 or 26, 2010: Sheikh al-Fateh, AQ chief in Afghanistan and
Pakistan (BBC, Geo, AFP, Reuters)
September 14, 2010: Saifullah, Siraj Haqqani's cousin (Dawn/AFP)
June 29, 2010: Hamza al-Jufi, AQ commander (NYT)
May 22-23, 2010: Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (FP)
March 8, 2010: Sadam Hussein Al Hussami, also known as Ghazwan AlYemeni, al-Qaeda planner and explosives expert with contacts in AQAP
and Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (AP)
February 24, 2010: Mohammad Qari Zafar, Taliban commander wanted in
2006 Karachi consulate bombing
February 17, 2010: Sheikh Mansoor, Egyptian-Canadian al-Qaeda leader
February 15, 2010: Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, al-Qaeda linked leader of a
group called the Turkistani Islamic Party
January 9, 2010: Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim, wanted for his alleged role in
the 1986 hijacking of Pan American World Airways flight during a stop in
the southern Pakistani city of Karachi (BBC, AP, Asian Tribune) [Author
note: BBC says he "died" on Jan. 9, AP says he was killed by a drone on
Jan. 9, and Asian Tribune says he died in the strike on Ismail Khel, which
happened on Jan. 10 as per AFP, AP, CNN, Dawn, Times of India, and
Geo.]
Early January, 2010: Mahmud Mahdi Zeidan, Jordanian Taliban
commander, bodyguard of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid

December 31, 2009: Haji Omar, key Taliban commander in Mir Ali, North
Waziristan
December 17, 2009: Zuhaib al-Zahibi, well-known al Qaeda commander
in North Waziristan
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December 8, 2009: Saleh al-Somali, al Qaeda's external operations chief
and link between al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al Qaeda
abroad.
September 14, 2009: Nazimuddin Zalalov alias Yahyo, a leader of the
Islamic Jihad of Uzbekistan and a lieutenant of al Qaeda chief Osama bin
Laden
September 7, 2009: Ilyas Kashmiri, al Qaeda's chief of paramilitary
operations in Pakistan [Author note: someone named Ilyas Kashmiri
claiming to be the chief of al Qaeda in Afghanistan gave an interview to
the Asia Times on October 15; he is now believed to be alive.]
August 27, 2009: Tahir Yuldashev, leader of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, linked to al Qaeda [Author note: Die Welt unearthed a video
of him in January 2010; current status unclear.]
August 5, 2009: Baitullah Mehsud
[unknown, 2009]: Saad bin Laden, OBL's son (NPR) [Author note: Saad
bin Laden was reported living in Iran by his brother, Omar, in December
2009: AP. His current status is unclear.]
April 29, 2009: Abu Sulayman al Jazairi, an Algerian Qaeda planner who
American intelligence officials say they believe helped train operatives for
attacks in Europe and the United States.
January 1, 2009: Osama al Kini and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, who
played central roles in the 1998 embassy bombings

November 22, 2008: Rashid Rauf, a British national who is a key suspect
in the 2006 plot to bring down U.S. and Canadian airliners, and Abu
Zubair al Masri, a senior member of al Qaeda (though Rauf has since been
reported to be alive)
November 19, 2008: Abdullah Azzam al Saudi, senior member of al
Qaeda
(sometime in October 2008): Abu Hassan al Rimi, al Qaeda "emir", led
cross-border operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan
October 31, 2008: Abu Jihad al Masri, Al Qaeda's propaganda chief, and
Abu Kasha/Abu Akash, a key militant link who fought against the Soviets
in the 1980s (unconfirmed; now believed to have escaped)
October 26, 2008: Mohammad Omar, close associate of Nek Mohammed,
Taliban commander
October 16, 2008: Khalid Habib, senior member of al Qaeda
September 17, 2008: Abu Ubaydah al Tunisi, high value target
September 8, 2008: Abu Haris, Al Qaeda's chief in Pakistan
September 4, 2008: Abu Wafa Al Saudi, al Qaeda commander and
logistician
Aug. 13, 2008: Abdul Rehman, a Taliban commander in South Waziristan
July 28, 2008: Abu Khabab al Masri, al Qaeda's WMD expert
May 14, 2008: Abu Sulayman Jazairi, another Algerian al Qaeda planner
(distinct from person of same name killed April 29, 2009)
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January 29, 2008: Abu Laith al Libi, orchestrated a 2007 suicide attack
targeting Vice President Dick Cheney while he was visiting Bagram;
described as the number-three man in the al Qaeda hierarchy.

2007 – none known
2006 – none known
2005
•
•

November 30, 2005: Abu Hamza Rabia, top al Qaeda official
May 2005: Haitham al-Yemeni, al Qaeda explosives expert

2004
•

June 18, 2004: Nek Mohammed, Pakistani Taliban leader

APPENDIX F - “Year of the Drone” Statistical Data on Drone Strikes and
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)
or drones are remotely operated, fixed winged aircraft of infinite sizes and shapes
that entered the world’s stage in the early 2000s. What separates drones from
traditional aircraft is the location of the pilot and the technological advances that
have been incorporated into drones. Drone operators can be anywhere from a
couple of miles to half a world away from the actual aircraft while it is in flight.
The technology incorporated in these vehicles allows for unparalleled
reconnaissance abilities. Drones can fly at their cruising altitudes far longer than
traditional aircraft both because of technological capabilities as well as the
reduced human limitations by the pilots. The cameras on most drones are capable
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of reading license plate numbers or positively identifying specific individuals on
the ground from its cruising altitude. Specialized drones have been developed
with stealth capabilities, and some of the larger drones have been fitted with
AGM-114R Hellfire Missiles in order to give these drones the capability of
conducting offensive operations.
The emergence of drones was a frightening event for many legal scholars
and defense strategists. Many fear that the absence of a pilot in the actual aircraft
removes the “human element” to warfare, a phenomenon coined the “PlayStation
Effect.” The manner in which drones have been used by the United States
government is particularly disturbing to this group of intellectuals as well.
Drones have been used in a targeted killing campaign against al-Qaeda and
affiliate organization members for the past decade in nations around the world.
While the world is in a general agreement that these individuals must be brought
to justice, a legal question remains as to whether this campaign by the United
States is legal under the various applicable bodies of law.
The United States’ strategy in combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates has
drastically evolved since 2001. David Petraeus, David Kilcullen and others
worked tirelessly in the early years of the “War on Terror” to develop a strategy
to understand and defeat the al-Qaeda insurgency. The introduction of drones
almost exactly at this time led many strategists to wonder if the use of drones
worldwide to selectively destroy certain members of the al-Qaeda leadership was
beneficial at all. The theory being that by killing an insurgent leader or member,
that that would simply create local distrust, anti-American sentiment and lead to
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more recruits for al-Qaeda, similar to the mythical hydra monster. Still, despite
these theories and warnings that a targeted killing campaign could produce
negative results in the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy, the campaign
expanded to hunt al-Qaeda insurgents in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and
sparsely to other nations around the world.
The intention of this capstone is to analyze drones, their performance over
years of use and the legal and strategic implications of their use to make a
conclusion regarding the legality and strategic effectiveness of drones.
Unfortunately, much of the information on drones, and drone strikes is classified
by the United States government and will not be released anytime soon. This has
become an inherent problem in the study of drones for many researchers, even on
a professional level. Only a limited few studies exist on the statistical
performance of drones in the field, these studies are largely based on estimations
and mostly limited to Pakistan where the larger media presence makes it possible
to track the drone strikes that were reported by the media. Having said this, the
analysis of drone performance in this capstone will incorporate these studies, but
not rely on them as a core of its conclusion. The method used to determine drone
legality will be a thorough analysis of international law, domestic law and the
opinions of legal scholars, with respect to war and armed conflict, to see if drones
and drone use fit within these legal frameworks. This presents a particular
challenge. International law is a sporadic, and often incomplete, series of treaties
and agreements made to determine how an actor in war will conduct itself. As a
result, a new tool or tactic, such as drones, is not specifically mentioned in
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international law. Moreover, there are multiple authorities both for and against
the use of drones, all of which have strong arguments and justifications.
Although a clear decision on drone legality, that all parties will accept, may be
impossible to create, this capstone will develop a legal argument as to why drones
are legal and why the United States’ argument for drone use is strong. Lastly, the
concept of an insurgent-based conflict and the United States’ modern
counterinsurgency strategy will be broken down to conclude whether drones have
a fitting place in counterinsurgency warfare.
Research on drones and drone performance is significant in numerous
ways. (1) Legal battles have occurred since drones’ inception and will ultimately
continue. For the meantime, it seems as if this clash of opinions will continue but
eventually a consensus will be made as to whether or not the United States is
crossing a legal or ethical line with its drone use. Continued research and
formation of arguments will inevitably lead the international community to
establish once and for all a legal precedent regarding drones and drone use. (2)
The United States’ current counterinsurgency theory is a strategy, and indeed a
method of perceiving a conflict and an enemy, that is new to the United States’
military and intelligence communities. The introduction of drones was a “game
changing” moment in the formation of these strategies. The broad and seemingly
unrestricted manner in which drones have been employed have resulted in
consequences that are not fully understood as of yet. Drone strikes have the
potential to cripple the al-Qaeda network, but they simultaneously have the
potential to cause needless destruction and anti-American sentiment. Continued
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research on these effects will assist policy makers and strategists in the future use
of drones. (3) The U.S. public is unequivocally ignorant of the existence of drone
use. Despite the blatant lack of secrecy surrounding this classified program, U.S.
citizens are relatively unaware that its government is conducting this campaign
around the world. Although some may argue that this is irrelevant, most citizens
do not possess the knowledge or understanding to make an informed opinion
regarding drones. However, it is important that the United States show that they
are combating al-Qaeda to keep its citizens safe and that the actions that they take
are necessary, proportional and legal.
Drones are, presently, significant in the United States’ conflict with alQaeda’s insurgency, but they will inevitably remain significant in the future.
Drones are technologically advanced, but drones are still a new technology. The
potential for growth and advancement in drones is infinite at this point, and while
drones are currently a vital tool in the United States’ asymmetric,
counterinsurgent strategy, they could become a tool to be used in conventional
war or even replace traditional aircraft completely.

